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1. Introduction 
 
Historically financial institutions have been large mail users as they provided financial information 
and paper statements to their customers, but in more recent times their customers have been offered 
the choice of alternative services through the digital medium on-line.  The customers of these 
institutions not only have a choice of bank, but also a choice in the kind of service they receive 
within the transactional market.  In recent years we have observed a significant switching from 
transactional mail to the digital alternative.  These market developments are important for policy 
makers to understand as they seek to maintain the financial viability of the Universal Service 
Provider (USP). 
 
In De Donder et al. (2012a), we looked at the welfare and pricing impacts for the USP and use of 
transactional mail in the presence of a digital alternative and charges to customers for mail and 
digital services.  We considered the case where a social planner sets the producer and customer 
prices (other than those assumed to be constant) to maximize welfare.  We also considered the case 
where the banks profit maximize in setting their customer prices in the transactional market with 
the social planner then setting other prices for postal products to maximize welfare. Finally we 
introduced a cap on the single piece price, with the USP’s financial viability threatened by the 
digital competition to transactional mail. The results and analysis brought to the fore the 
consideration of public policy and the balance of choices between the customer demand for the 
universal service and associated fixed costs of the USP, the incentives and profit maximizing 
behaviour of the banks and the customer demand for and development of the alternative electronic 
medium. 
 
In this paper, we look more closely at the customer behaviour in the transactional market and 
factors that influence the choice of services.  In particular, we look at the choice between two 
financial services distinguished by paper and digital statements within a model à la Hotelling 
(Hotelling 1929). Two horizontally differentiated banks compete to attract customers by offering, 
among other things, two horizontally differentiated transactional media: paper statements and a 
digital alternative. Customers differ according to their intrinsic preferences for one bank versus the 
other one (for reasons assumed to be exogenous) and for one transactional medium versus the other 
one. We assume that the two dimensions of preferences are independently and uniformly 
distributed in the population.  We focus on the pricing by banks of transactional media, so that we 
concentrate on how banks attract (or retain) customers by pricing the two transactional media in 
order to maximize their profit. We examine how the demand for paper statements by banks' 
customers is affected by, among others, the price of mail as set by the USP to the banks and 
marginal transaction costs.  
 
In Section 2 we summarise the framework of the double Hotelling model.  In Section 3 we show 
how this model informs us of how price and non-price factors affect demand for paper and digital 
services, with the mail price included as a marginal cost to the banks in the provision of the paper 
statement services.  We explore how profit maximisation of the banks leads to the full pass through 
of any mail price to customers, as well as factors that affect the impact on the demands for the two 
services.  Within this framework we then extend the analysis to consider the scenario where banks 
do not directly charge for paper or digital services in Section 4.  We consider how the banks’ 
approach to charging for its paper and digital statements can affect the demand for those services 
and, further, how mail price changes can affect their respective demand.  In Section 5 we conclude 
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that this framework brings greater clarity as to the role of mail price as an input cost to one medium 
in the presence of a digital alternative within the transactional market, and its effect on demand.   
 
2. Model framework 
 
We here set out the salient features of the model.  The full model is set out in detail in De Donder et 
al (2012b). 
 
There are two banks (A and B) and each bank offers the choice of services with digital statements 
(good 1) and paper substitute (good 2). Both banks and both products within any bank are 
considered as horizontally differentiated by customers.  Even if both products were similarly priced 
by a bank, some customers from that bank would prefer paper statements while other would prefer 
the electronic substitute. Similarly, even with prices equal across banks, some customers would 
prefer bank A while other would prefer bank B. 
 
Both transactional media are located on a [0,1] segment, denoted by Z, with the digital medium at 
zero and paper statements are one. Each final consumer has a preference for both goods that is 
characterized by his location z on Z. That is, an individual located at z  incurs a disutility of z  (the 
distance between his most preferred variant of the good and the characteristic of good 1) times a 
‘transportation cost’ r when consuming good 1, and a disutility of (1 - z ) times r when consuming 
good 2.    
 
Similarly, banks are located on another [0,1] segment, denoted by X, with bank A at zero and bank 
B at one. Each individual has a location x on Xthat represents his preferences for the two banks. 
This preference is a function of all characteristics of the banks, which are assumed exogenous. An 
individual located at x  incurs a disutility of x  (the distance between his most preferred variant of 
the bank and the characteristics of bank A) times a ‘transport cost’ t  when opening an account with 
bank A, and a disutility of (1 - x ) times t when opening an account with bank B. 
 
We assume for simplicity that the two dimensions of preferences are orthogonal to each other, and 
thata continuum of mass one of customers are uniformly and independently distributed on the Z * X 
= [0,1]*[0,1] space. Alternative distributions could be applied, but we concentrate on the uniform 
distribution because of its simplicity. 
Within this framework we can look at the profit maximising outcome of the banks.  We assume that 
the banks first simultaneously set their prices in order to maximise their profit, with final customers 
then observing the prices in both banks and choosing which bank to patronise, and what type of 
alternative medium to buy in this bank. We solve this game and provide its Nash equilibrium in the 
next section. 
3. Price effect and market share results with banks charges 
We start by solving for the customers' decisions for given price levels. The customer price of good 
i  ( i  = 1, 2) in bank j  ( j  = A, B) is denoted by ijq .   Customers obtain a gross utility level of ijU  
when they consume one unit of good i in bank j . To obtain the net utility level, one has to subtract 
from this gross utility both the price of the good bought and the disutility incurred from consuming 
a good whose characteristics generically differ from the most-preferred one, in a bank whose 
characteristics also differ from the individually optimal ones. Customers have to choose one (and 
only one) bank, and one (and only one) transactional medium in that bank. They do this by 
comparing the net utility levels they obtain in each bank with each transactional medium. 
Intuitively, consumers with a low value of x prefer bank A to bank B, while consumers with a large 
value of z prefer paper statements to the digital alternative. We establish in De Donder et al (2012b) 
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that there exist threshold levels of both x and z that determine the choice of consumers. Although 
our results do not depend on the specific sequence of choices by customers, it is easier to illustrate 
them by assuming that they choose first their bank, and then the transactional medium they prefer. 
A customer choosingbank j (A or B) will then prefer paper statements to electronic medium 
provided that his preference for the former (measured by z) is larger than the following threshold: 
( ) ( )( )[ ]rqUqUz AAAAA 2/5.0 2211 −−−+= in bank A  
and ( ) ( )( )[ ]rqUqUz BBBBB 2/5.0 2211 −−−+= in bank B. 
Assume for instance that paper statements are a better deal (because of a lower price for instance) in 
bank A than in bank B. We then obtain that BA zz < . Anticipating their transactional medium 
choice, the consumer then decides to patronise bank A provided that his preference for this bank 
(measured by x) is lower than some threshold. If A Bz z z< < , the consumer anticipates that he will 
buy the electronic substitutes in both banks, and he joins bank A if his value of x is lower than the 
threshold  ( ) ( )( )[ ]tqUqUx BBAA 2/5.0 11111 −−−+= . If Bz z> , the consumer anticipates that he 
would buy paper statements in both banks, and chooses bank A provided that his preference x is 
lower than ( ) ( )( )[ ]tqUqUx BBAA 2/5.0 22222 −−−+= . Finally, for intermediate preference for 
paper statements ( A Bz z z< < ), the consumer chooses paper statements in bank A and the digital 
alternative in bank B.  
The choices made by customers between the two banks and two goods can be represented in a 2x2 
diagram with the choice between goods on the horizontal axis (Z) and choice of bank on the vertical 
axis (X), and both axes range from 0 to 1 indicate the proportioning of customers choosing between 
the banks and goods.  If the paper statements are relatively more attractive in banks A than in 
bank B (ie. BA zz < ) the customers’ preferences are as represented in Figure 11.   
zA < zB
x (preference towards bank B)
1
x2 
x1 
0 1  z (preference towards paper)zBzA
Figure 1: Choice of banks and of medium when 
Digital in
 bank B
Paper in
 bank B
Digital in 
bank B
Digital in 
bank A
Paper in 
bank A
Paper in 
bank A
 
                                                 
1 If A Bz z>  the diagonal slope in Figure 1 would be in the opposite direction.   
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We then have that as Az or Bz increases the market share and demand for paper statement reduces.  
For both banks the value of jz increases directly proportionate to increases in the price of paper 
statements (good 2) or decreases in the price of digital (good 1).  These represent own and cross 
price effects.   
 
In addition, for both banks the value of jz increases directly proportionate to the reduction in the 
utility of preference for paper statements (good2) or increases in the utility of preference of digital 
(good 1). These represent the non-price effects.  
 
The scale of both price and non-price effects depend inversely on r , the marginal ‘transport cost’ of 
the change, and are therefore less strong when these marginal ‘transport costs’ r are high.  
Conversely, at a lower r  the competition between the two goods intensifies (because they are seen 
as more and more alike by customers). 
 
We implicitly assume that there exists a price difference between the services with paper and digital 
statements such that customers would switch to digital if they were sufficiently cheaper than paper. 
Individuals who have no internet access would be located at or very close to one extreme where 
customers with paper statements are located. These are the individuals that require the largest 
difference in prices between the services with paper and digital statements to switch to the latter. 
How different the prices have to be for them to switch depends on the value of the parameter r . 
 
We now solve the profit-maximising choice of prices by both banks, when they are symmetrical 
both in terms of preferences (  for ,ij iU U j A B= = ) and in the marginal costs ijc  of providing 
product i in bank j (so that  for ,ij ic c j A B= = ). We show in De Donder et al (2012b) that there 
exists a unique symmetrical Nash equilibrium where tcq += 11 and tcq += 22 . In words, the 
equilibrium price for both goods in both banks equals its marginal cost plus a mark-up that is 
proportional to the transaction cost on the firm dimension. Since this transportation cost can be 
viewed as a measure of the degree of competition between banks (a lower value of t meaning a 
more competitive industry), we then obtain that the mark-up over marginal cost is inversely 
proportional to the intensity of competition between banks. 
 
At equilibrium, we then have BA zz = so that Figure 1 would change as shown in Figure 2 with 
BA zz = and the vertical axis is divided equally between the two banks. 
 
If we further assume that the marginal cost of paper statements is the sum of the marginal cost for 
the digital medium, of the mail price p and the preparation cost k, we obtain that 
 
tcq += 11  and tkpcq +++= 12  
so that the equilibrium price of paper statements exceeds the price of the electronic substitute by 
exactly the difference in marginal costs, p+k. 
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x (preference towards bank B)
1
x1 = x2 = 0.5
0 1  z (preference towards paper)zA = zB 
Figure 2: Choice of banks and of medium when equi-symmetric
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Digital in 
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Digital in 
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As an example, if 40.0,30.0,20.0,0, 121 ===== tcpkUU jj  and 40.0=r , then the Nash 
equilibrium where banks have equal utilities and costs (i.e. equi-symmetric), the market price for 
digital (good 1) is 0.70 and for paper (good 2) is 0.90, Furthermore, the market share for good 1 is 
75.0=iz  and for good 2 is 25.01 =− jz  (where Aj = or B ).   
 
Further, if the value of r  reduces from 0.40 to 0.30, then the market prices are the same but market 
share for the service with digital statements is 83.0=Az  and for the service with paper statements 
is 0.17.  This would reflect digital and paper statements becoming closer substitutes such that there 
is a move towards the lower priced service of digital statements. 
 
Alternatively, if we only changed the mail price from 0.20 to 0.30, then the market price for the 
service with paper statement (good 2) increases from 0.90 to 1.00 and the market share for the 
service with digital statements is 88.01 =z  and for the service with paper statements is 0.12.  The 
increase in the mail price is fully passed through to the customers of the services with paper 
statements and leads to a reduction in demand for those services as some customers switch to the 
digital alternative.   
 
4. Further results with and without bank charges 
At present in the transactional market we do not typically observe direct charges for bank paper 
statements.  We can obtain this result within our model framework by introducing an additional 
term 2s  for the profit made on each customer from its paper statements, beyond the direct service 
of the statement – for example coming from advertisements with the statements.  The introduction 
of 2s  acts as a negative marginal cost and has the effect of decreasing the market price 2q  banks 
charge for the paper statements such that its marginal cost is 212 skpcc −++= .  There then exists 
a value of 2s  that would lead to the price 2q banks charge for statements being zero. 
In a similar way we may consider the profit made on each customer from services with digital 
statements as 1s .  Then, there would exist a value of s1 that would lead to a zero market price 1q  for 
the service with digital statement.  Further if the marginal cost for digital statement is lower than 
that for paper statements this value of 1s  would be lower than the value of 2s  needed for the 
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market price of the paper statements to be zero.  We note that 1s and 2s  affect the absolute level of 
the market prices.  However, they do not change the result that any increase in the mail price p is 
passed through in totality to customers.  The previous result of the full pass through of the mail 
price within the marginal costs of good 2, in this symmetric case, remains unaffected by the 
introduction of the 1s  and 2s  terms.   
If banks make money on customers beyond the selling of statements (such that 0, 21 >ss )  this 
decreases banks' costs of providing transactional media, and the model tells us that the market 
equilibrium price of such media decreases by the full amount of this profit per customer. If the unit 
profit is the same for both transactional goods, the decrease in prices is the same for both goods. If 
somehow the unit profit is larger for paper statement users, then the price of paper statements 
decreases more than the price of digital. 
In the context of understanding the potential market share and demand effect of a change in the 
mail price p for the banking service associated with mail (i.e. paper statements), we can make a 
further observation from this and in the context of the interest rate paid by the banks to their 
customers on the digital and paper statement accounts.  An increase in p leads to a reduction in the 
market share of the service with paper statements, but the degree to which it does may depend on 
the charging policy of the banks.   
 
We can consider two independent scenarios: one where the banks have a positive charge for the 
services with paper statement 02>q  and one where it is negative 02<q .   While a change to p 
could move the position from one scenario to the other (from 02>q to 02<q ), our focus is more 
that the banks could move from one to the other through a change to its charging policy and, 
furthermore, when 02<q , the effect of a mail price change on volume could be less than the same 
price changed in an environment when 02>q .   
 
When 02<q , we have the possibility of a negative price being charged to the customers of services 
with paper statements which could be represented by a zero price for the paper statements and a 
reduction in the interest payment to customers (akin to a negative value of 2s  above).  An increase 
in mail price could then lead to retention of the zero price for the services with paper statements and 
a reduction in the interest payment to customers for the services with paper statement. We note that 
the effect of the mail price on demand is indirect or implicit as it is through the interest 
payment.When 02>q  we have a direct or explicit charge for the paper statement such that the mail 
price change has a direct effect on market share.   
 
The symmetric equilibrium described above would apply in both scenarios (either when 0<iq , or 
when 0>iq ) and the same variable relationships apply in both. Hence, for example, the value of r 
again affects the market share of the service with paper statements.  If the value of r is the same 
whether 02=q  with a low interest payment or 02>q  with a higher interest payment, ceteris 
paribus there would be the same market share for the service with paper statements for the two 
scenarios.  However, if the value of r  differs as to whether 02=q  with a low interest payment or 
02>q  with a higher interest payment, the market share of the service with paper statements would 
not be the same between the two scenarios.   The r  value could be different, and reduce in value, 
between the two scenarios if customers’ preferences change with a move between indirect and 
direct charging environment by the banks, such that the two services are seen to be closer 
substitutes were the banks to directly charge for the statement services.  This would then affect both 
the market share and responsiveness of demand to price changes.   
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Hence, if the banking environment changed from one scenario, we might observe (i) a step change 
in market share and (ii) a step change in the price elasticity with respect to p .  While we cannot 
conclude on the magnitude of the change in r that could occur with a change in scenario, it is 
possible for there to be both a step loss in market share for the mail industry and an enhanced loss 
of market share if the mail price increased, dependent on the relative values of r  between the two 
scenarios.  A change in banking charging may then lead to a step change in both the market share 
and price elasticity of the banking service that uses the mail medium.   
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have discussed a Hotelling model framework in two dimensions with two banks each selling 
two services with digital and paper statements respectively.  We show that when banks profit 
maximise the market price for the service with paper statements includes a mark up on marginal 
cost to reflect ‘marginal transport or transaction costs’ for customers and there is a full pass through 
of any mail price to their customers in the symmetric case. We can use this model to show how 
customer utilities from the two goods and marginal costs including the price of mail affect the 
demand for the services of paper and digital statements, and hence how developments in 
preferences for digital banking services and increases in mail prices can both lead to a reduction in 
mail demand.  We have also described how, if the banking environment were to change its charging 
policy from one that implicitly charges customers the mail price to one that explicitly charges the 
mail price, this could lead to a step change in both the demand for services with paper statements 
and the demand elasticity with respect to the mail price.  Other exogenous changes which move 
customer perceptions and preference could potentially have similar effects.   
 
We then have the potential for the price elasticity of demand for mail services to remain fairly 
stable for those remaining with the paper statements while the current market environment 
continues.  Even so, mail volumes may continue to fall as customers preferences change.  However, 
if that market environment changes, for example through financial institutions changing the way in 
which they recover mail charges from their customers, this could have a significant impact on the 
mail service, both in terms of a shift in mail demand and greater sensitivity to further mail price 
increases. 
 
Hence, we provide an economic rationale and framework for considering changes in demand and 
price elasticities for mail in a banking sector that could be extended to other sectors serviced by 
mail and digital media. This framework brings greater clarity as to the role of mail price as an input 
cost to one medium in the presence of a digital alternative within the transactional market, and its 
effect on demand.  Further extensions of the model could consider alternative conditions that could 
affect the degree to which a mail price changes affects demand.  It therefore provides an economic 
framework for postal mail demand, for further investigation within economics, econometrics and 
customer market analysis. 
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